











A number of those actively involved in the physical sciences anticipate the creation of a unified approach to all human knowledge based on reductionism in physics and Platonism in mathematics. We argue that it is implausible that this goal will ever be achieved, and argue instead for a pluralistic approach to human understanding, in which mathematically expressed laws of nature are merely one way among several of describing a world that is too complex for our minds to be able to grasp in its entirety. 






In spite of the enormous advances in the sciences since 1600, some of the basic questions about the philosophy of science have not been resolved. The relationship between the goal-driven activity of human beings on the one hand and the physical sciences on the other needs to be radically reassessed if it is to have any chance of being clarified. In this article we argue that abandoning reductionism and Platonism provide an essential first step in this process.

It is generally agreed that the goal of science is to find naturally based and testable descriptions of the world, the more detailed the better. This does not in itself commit one to the belief that the physicist’s Theory of Everything is the final goal. Consilience, the search for coherent and interconnected explanations of the world, is not the same as reductionism: connections between theories do not necessarily have to have arrows attached to them. There is only one world, but we argue that we will probably always have to content ourselves with a wide variety of overlapping ways of understanding it.​[1]​ 

The best attempt to break out of the reductionist-Platonist straightjacket may be that of Kant. Unfortunately his writing is obscure, possibly incoherent, and interpreting his work has become a major industry.​[2]​ The Kant of this article is a reconstruction informed by recent advances in science. In spite of the fact that his discussions of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics are fatally flawed,​[3]​ his metaphysics contains ideas of considerable value. However, one needs to restate them in a form that he would not have recognized, because many relevant discoveries about the functioning of the brain had not been made.

We recall the Kantian distinction between the nature of ‘things in themselves’, and our representations of them, which are heavily influenced by the manner in which our brains process the raw information reaching our sense organs.​[4]​ The importance of the distinction is strongly supported by research into neural processing of images in the retina and brain, resulting in what we call three-dimensional vision.​[5]​ Experimental psychology teaches us that what we call vision is in fact a highly elaborate construction. Kant’s belief about the synthetic a priori nature of Euclidean geometry was not justified for reasons already discussed at length by Poincaré in 1902,​[6]​ but that does not render the whole concept of a priori knowledge invalid. 

The modern translation of Kant’s concept of innate knowledge of the structure of space is the existence of genetically programmed neural circuits in the eye and visual cortex. Current research shows that this is a very complex issue. The detailed anatomy of the visual cortex varies substantially between individuals as well as between species. At one extreme the vision of ungulate foals, which have to walk with the herd within a few hours of birth, must be largely hard-wired. On the other hand edge orientation circuits in cats do not develop normally if they are denied exposure to relevant stimuli during a critical period after birth. In this case an interaction between the programmed development of neurons and the environment is crucial. Nevertheless the uniform reactions of people to optical illusions demonstrates that the response of the brain is heavily constrained by the innate capacity of the visual system.​[7]​ This is an active field of research that will not lead to a simple conclusion, but there is overwhelming evidence that that a baby is not born as a ‘tabula rasa’ as Locke contended. Why so many people choose to disregard this evidence is another question.​[8]​

Much recent psychological research on the notion of cause and effect, focuses on the methods that people use to distinguish covariation from causation. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that we have an innate and unavoidable propensity to describe large classes of phenomena in causal terms,​[9]​ whether or not the equations of fundamental physics are non-causal in character, as Norton argues.​[10]​ Popper agreed with this analysis, and emphasized that innate expectations may not always be satisfied; in Kantian terms a priori knowledge is regulative and need not be valid in the external world.​[11]​ On the other hand any organism whose innate expectations do not relate reasonably well to the external world is not likely to survive long.

The word ‘pluralism’ is used in cultural, ethnical as well as philosophical contexts. In the last case it is usually interpreted ontologically: in other words it claims that the world in itself has more than ultimate substance. Descartes characterized these as matter and mind. The relationship between phenomena and noumena in Kant’s work has been a matter of much debate, which we do not attempt to resolve. Popper’s three worlds relate to physical entities, mental states and the contents of human thought, such as social institutions and scientific theories.​[12]​ Penrose also has three worlds, the physical, mental and Platonic, but his Platonic world​[13]​ is completely different from Popper’s World 3. The former is supposed to be eternal, while the latter develops with time. Many other fundamental categories have been proposed, including the flow of information. 

Ontological pluralism has fallen out of favour as a result of the triumphant progress of physics since the start of the seventeenth century, but it has been defended by Dupré and Cartwright, among others. We support a lot of what they have written, but take issue with the strong tendency of Cartwright in particular to diminish the enormous achievements of the physical sciences. Dupré repeats and elaborates some of her comments, but his book focuses mainly on the biological sciences, where the distinction between ontological and epistemological pluralism is not so clear. In Cartwright’s enthusiasm to convince the reader that there are many things that cannot be realistically understood using the laws of physics alone, she repeatedly makes the wholly incorrect claim that there are few situations outside laboratories in which the laws of physics do apply.​[14]​ Their statement that the laws of Newtonian mechanics are only true when other forces are absent​[15]​ is only valid in the extremely limited sense that one has to take account of all the forces acting on a body when calculating its motion: reductionism involves synthesis as well as analysis. Newton’s law that action and reaction are equal and opposite is not limited to mechanical forces or rigid bodies. If the law of conservation of momentum could be broken by constructing a machine that combined rigid bodies, fluids and electromagnetic forces, all confined inside a box, physicists would be truly astonished. There are innumerable examples that run counter to the suggestion of Cartwright and Dupré that the laws of physics may only hold in the limited context of a laboratory.​[16]​ For example, the huge progress in paleoclimatology since 1980 has depended upon reconciling scientific evidence obtained from radioactive decay products, ice cores, marine sediments, tree rings, pollen and many other sources. The fact that this has proved possible reinforces one’s belief that each of these sources of information is reliable and that the scientific laws involved were applicable throughout the quaternary period (and earlier).​[17]​  The measurements might be done in laboratories, but the information dates from before the existence of the human race. The same applies to the spectroscopic analysis of the light from distant stars, which demonstrates beyond serious doubt that the laws of physics have not changed significantly for billions of years in time, and over billions of light-years in space. Moreover they explain the behaviour of bodies that differ as much from laboratories as anything could. The unravelling of the genetic code established that the domain of chemistry includes the extremely messy and complex environment of the cell, far removed from the context in which the laws were discovered. 

Chemistry may be used to explain the behaviour of a huge number of phenomena outside the laboratory. The classification of the chemical elements using the periodic table was obtained long before quantum mechanics was created. Nevertheless the table may be explained by analyzing the energy levels of the relevant number of electrons orbiting each nucleus using the rules of quantum mechanics. The predictions of quantum theory are confirmed to the extent that the computations can be performed. This is one of the proofs that quantum theory is more than just a framework for constructing phenomenological models. One could go on, but it should by now be clear that physical laws do not only operate in specially constructed situations and that they have universal significance.

When we use the word pluralism we intend it to be interpreted in a purely epistemological sense.​[18]​ The pluralism that we discuss pertains not to the world itself, but to our attempts to understand it in terms accessible to our limited mental powers. We accept that the world is a unity, in spite of the fact that we have no workable description of it in such terms. Cartwright and Dupré are right to emphasize those who believe that we are close to achieving this goal ignore most human activity in the process. Physical science might be characterized as the study of those aspects of the world that (a) can be described without invoking final causes and (b) do not involve human agencies in their description. Most human activities – education, agriculture, politics, investment, even scientific research – are incomprehensible unless one thinks in terms of their goals. One can avoid teleological language when discussing animal behaviour by invoking instinct, but attempts to apply similar arguments to all of our vastly more complex interactions with each other strike the author as wholly unconvincing.

Whatever might be the ultimate goals of some scientists, science, as it is currently practised, depends on multiple overlapping descriptions of the world, each of which has a domain of applicability. In some cases this domain is very large, but in others quite small. These descriptions change over time, and are valued on the basis of the understanding that they provide. Scientific progress is achieved by creating new descriptions, abandoning obsolete descriptions and modifying the domains of applicability of existing descriptions. We will see that descriptions are not currently ordered in a hierarchy, and argue that there is no compelling reason to believe that all descriptions of the world will one day be deduced from a single fundamental theory. Eighty years after the discovery of general relativity and quantum mechanics, physicists still depend on two mutually inconsistent theories that have totally different ontologies, even though both are highly successful in their own domains of applicability. Chemists live comfortably with multiple ontologies, and physicists also have to do so, in spite of their dreams of a better situation. 

Although we will discuss the influence of social constructions and shared concepts (Popper’s World 3) on physical events, we deliberately avoid any discussion of the status of subjective consciousness. That is a subject that generates more heat that light, and we do not need to resolve it in order to press our main thesis. Whether our proposals have any relevance to that important issue remains to be seen. 

One of the main requirements of a general account of scientific understanding is that it does not confine itself to those examples that support it. The following is a short list of traps into which one can fall. In an ontology formulated in terms of mathematical equations, understanding teleological explanations or even the notion of cause and effect may well be impossible.​[19]​ Basing the philosophy of mathematics on developments in formal logic and set theory during the period between 1900 and 1940 ignores the inconvenient historical fact that the Greeks invented the powerhouse of modern mathematics, the axiomatic method, in total ignorance of them.  One needs to realize that mathematics as used by most physicists is very different from the mathematics of pure mathematicians. Physicists often claim that a subject is completely understood when mathematicians regard even the problems as not yet well-defined. Both groups are right from their own point of view. We agree with Norton that one needs to beware of impoverished and contrived worlds in which problems such as that involving ‘grue’ make sense.​[20]​ Philosophers do better to draw attention to the extreme richness of the real world and the problems associated with over-simplification, than to copy the style of argument appropriate in some branches of physics.






Many scientists and philosophers have described themselves as realists, reductionists or physicalists. These words have so many interpretations that we have to select one position to criticize, and leave the reader to work out for himself whether and how our comments apply to related positions.

We will use the term reductionism to refer to the following statements and minor variants of them. There is a hierarchy of scientific theories, some more fundamental than others. In particular physics is more fundamental than chemistry, which is in turn more fundamental than biology. Within physics, quantum theory is more fundamental than Newtonian mechanics, and statistical mechanics is more fundamental than thermodynamics. The less fundamental theories can in principle be derived from the more fundamental ones, even when they involve introducing new modes of description. At the bottom level is a single Theory of Everything (TofE) which incorporates the four known fundamental fields (electromagnetic, weak, strong and gravitational) in a single set of mathematical equations, and which in principle explains every phenomenon. 

The construction of a TofE has been an aspiration of theoretical physicists for many decades, but its potential contribution to physics has been questioned sharply by Anderson and others. As a mathematical enterprise it is a very worthy goal – having two well-confirmed but mutually inconsistent theories, quantum mechanics and general relativity, both of which generalize Newtonian mechanics, is a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs. We expect that the effort to construct a TofE will eventually be successful, and this will be its own reward, even if it leads to no new physics. Little remains of early optimism that there would prove to be only one such theory and that it would permit the computation of the fundamental constants of nature.  Leading theoreticians such as Sussman and t’Hooft accept that the best current candidate, string theory, will need deep modifications before it can provide a final theory. What the TofE will not do is herald the end of physics. Indeed it is not likely to make any difference to the vast majority of physicists, because the energies at which it is important are so extreme. The same actually holds even for ordinary quantum mechanics: in the words of Laughlin and Pines “We have succeeded in reducing all ordinary physical behaviour to a single correct Theory of Everything, only to discover that it has revealed exactly nothing about many things of great importance”.​[21]​  

Reductionism has a long history, described by Midgley, who characterizes it as arising largely from a sense of moral indignation against various excesses of organized religion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.​[22]​ Reductionism is easy to criticize in the biological sciences, because of the multiple viewpoints needed in that field of science.​[23]​ We echo some (but by no means all) of the criticisms made by Midgley and Dupré, but do so in terms that address the central interests of fundamental physics, the citadel of reductionist attitudes. Weinberg, often regarded as an arch-reductionist, agrees that science has nothing to say about values, morals or aesthetics,​[24]​ but others such as Atkins have no such scruples.

As a philosophical system reductionism owes a lot to Platonism. It disregards ethics, subjective consciousness, final causes, etc. for the sake of a simple impersonal account, not of reality, but of what is supposed to lie behind reality. The means by which mathematical equations could, even in principle, control the movements of bodies is carefully not addressed, in spite of its fundamental importance. In the seventeenth century God was supposed to ensure that bodies moved in accordance with His laws. This is no longer considered to be an acceptable answer, but at least it acknowledged the existence of the question.
 
In the context of the physical sciences, reductionism has been an extremely successful methodology. In appropriate contexts it is by far the best current way to understand phenomena, and likely to remain so. Complicated phenomena are investigated by considering them as the result of the interaction of simpler components that are investigated individually in the simplest possible situations. The fact that these components are described by mathematical equations is not in itself remarkable, since physics could be characterized as that part of science whose laws are wholly mathematical in character. It is more surprising that the most fundamental physical theories depend upon the most abstract and difficult mathematics, but perhaps this also is inevitable. If Newtonian mechanics had depended on abstract operator theory while quantum mechanics had only needed Euclidean geometry, then the earlier subject would probably never have been invented. 

It is debatable whether an explanation of a physical effect in terms of mathematical equations provides full understanding. Newton’s inverse square law of gravitational attraction was severely criticized by Huygens and Leibniz for not providing a physical explanation of gravitation, and he accepted this criticism in later editions of Principia. Under the influence of scientists such as Laplace, the need for something more than a mathematical formulation was forgotten. Gradually finding the appropriate mathematical equations came to be regarded as providing the only explanation one could ask for in physics. The apparent scope of physical theories is increased by consigning those aspects of physical systems that cannot be explained to the lower status of initial conditions.​[25]​  In cosmology the form of the entire universe depends on the initial state, and it now seems possible that the values of the fundamental constants of nature should be regarded as accidental; see below. In quantum mechanics the hope of understanding the ‘true nature’ of quantum particles has been abandoned by many physicists, even though its predictive success is so wide-ranging that it must be tapping into something very fundamental about the world. 

Almost every practising scientist accepts that chemistry can be reduced to physics in the sense that all chemical forces that can in principle be deduced from quantum mechanics (QM). The award of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry to Kohn and Pople in 1998 recognized that this reduction has been transformed from an aspiration to an actual achievement. Although these facts support reductionism from chemistry to physics, one needs to remember even in this case that QM was only accepted as a fundamental theory of matter because of its success in this respect. Indeed it was supplemented, as it was being created, by the introduction of Fermi-Dirac statistics, without which it was not able to explain the structure of most atoms and molecules. Most of chemistry can only be deduced from QM after the event because of the extreme difficulty of solving the QM equations. Thus the existence of buckminsterfullerene, C60, was not predicted from QM. After it was discovered experimentally, Kroto elucidated its structure by using the primitive ball and stick model. The same applies to the discovery of the structure of DNA. The compatibility of mature theories of chemical interactions and of fundamental physics is ensured by the fact that the subject matters of the two fields overlap, so that both are constrained by the same properties of the world. 

Following the elucidation of the structure of DNA and its connection with the genetic code in 1953, reductionism became the established orthodoxy in molecular biology: the form of an organism was controlled by its DNA, and once one understood that, one understood everything important. This simple picture had to be modified following the discovery of regulatory mechanisms by Jacob, Lwoff and Monod. It has been realized that whether of not a gene is expressed, i.e. whether it performs its functions within the cell, is under the control of components of the cell outside it. In particular the cell turns off one of a woman’s two X chromosomes by the process of methylation. How such a system evolved is quite another question, but in existing organisms the genes and the cell depend intimately on each other. There is also evidence that genes can be inactivated by phenomena in the external environment of the entire organism. There is nothing vitalistic or non-physical about this, but it makes the reductionist hierarchy physics → chemistry → genes → cells → organisms much less useful, except as a crude first approximation.

Reductionists take the view that every physical event is ultimately grounded in microphysics. They conclude that high level causes are no more than convenient fictions, or manners of talking, on the basis that if they were absent the event would continue to occur. This argument depends on the idea that an event can have only one genuine or proper cause, more widely accepted in physics than it is in biology. Indeed Rose starts ‘Lifelines’ with five different explanations of why a frog might jump into a pond, taking the viewpoint of a physiologist, an ethologist, a developmental biologist, an evolutionist and a molecular biologist.​[26]​ In our terms these are regarded as overlapping descriptions, none of which has the right to be regarded as providing the ‘real’ explanation. The second explanation is teleological, or, as biologists prefer to say, teleonomic. 

Some biologists object strongly to the use of teleological language, or even references to function, at the cellular level.​[27]​ At a higher level one cannot avoid it. Skinner’s conditioned reflexes were driven by the physicalist philosophy of efficient causes; they may be applicable to some animal behaviour but are no longer considered acceptable explanations for the social interactions of the great apes. In this paper we only require the reader to accept that we need to use teleological language in order to understand human social interactions.​[28]​ Eliminative materialists might question even this, but they are then rejecting a simple and useful mode of explanation in favour of one that currently does not exist, and may never do so. As a particular example we contend that it is impossible for us to understand organ replacement surgery without using the language of cause, effect and goals.

In spite of its stunning successes, Popper has argued that the reductionist programme has failed to give an account of the influence of high level phenomena on processes that seem to lie within the domain of applicability of more ‘fundamental’ theories.​[29]​  The following example supports his thesis. During the twentieth century the quantity of CFCs in the Earth’s atmosphere increased steadily until about 1990, after which it stabilized and started gradually to decrease again. The presence of CFCs in the atmosphere was the result of their being manufactured at an increasing rate up to 1987, but decreasingly after that. CFCs have an effect on the ozone layer, and hence on the amount of ultra-violet radiation reaching the surface of the Earth, but explaining the reduction in their production after 1987 involves introducing concepts that have nothing to do with physics and chemistry. 

The key fact in any explanation must be the international meeting in 1987 in which the participants expressed their concern that CFCs might lead to mass starvation because of crop failures. The Montreal Protocol, signed by more than a hundred countries, agreed to eliminate the production of CFCs over a period of time. The explanation for the reduction in CFC emission is not the existence of a certain physical document, but the political process initiated by the concerns of various scientists, starting with Rowland and Molina in 1973.

It might be claimed that the concerns of scientists correspond to certain types of brain state, and that these are in principle explicable in terms of biochemical and physiological processes that ultimately depend on the laws of physics. The political process leading to the Montreal Protocol would, in such terms, be the result of the interaction of the brain states of a large number of individuals coming from a variety of countries around the world. However, this ‘explanation’ is no more than an aspiration, and has no prospect of being implemented in the foreseeable future.​[30]​ It cannot be compared to the detailed description in ordinary language of the historical, political and social background to the Protocol. While we can probably establish a connection between anxiety per se and certain types of brain state, we have no idea how to establish a connection between worrying about the effect of CFCs on world climate and brain states. There is no reason to believe that a science of political treaties based, through a series of reductions, on the laws of quantum mechanics will ever emerge. 

A huge number of similar examples could be provided, but we consider only one more: the performance of a chess-playing computer. At a physical level one observes that every few minutes a small amount of data is fed into a very complex program, resulting in lengthy computations followed by a very small output. One could inspect the program and explain in a purely mechanical way how it acts on the data to produce the output. Aristotle called this the efficient cause of its behaviour. Technically the computer program identifies the move that maximizes a very complicated function, whose value is intended (by the programmer not by the computer) to represent how likely each move is to ensure that the computer wins against an opponent using the same assessment procedure. Although this reductionist, or syntactical, account of the computer’s operation is absolutely accurate and complete in its own terms, we, as human beings, can only understand its program fully in teleological terms, i.e. by invoking the goal of the programmer. Such final causes have, however, been deliberately eliminated from reductive physics, which depends only on laws of motion and initial conditions. 

It might be argued that the ‘proper’ explanation of the behaviour of the computer is indeed the one based on efficient causes, and that the goals of the programmer are irrelevant to this. However, this only moves the problem one stage back. A reductionist should make exactly the same type of claim for the programmer, who cannot have goals, only behaviour. The goals of the game of chess never emerge in this type of analysis.

Theoretical physicists sometimes claim that they are only interested in universal laws, not particular events that depend on historical accidents. Such a lofty point of view elevates the Theory of Everything to the centre of the stage, and suggests that biology, geology and other sciences have an inferior status. Perhaps some other scientists acquiesce in this simply because they are intimidated by the mathematical knowledge of physicists, but our goal should be to understand as wide a range of phenomena as possible, using the appropriate concepts in each case, not to engage in power politics. It is ironic that physicists themselves are no longer sure that fundamental physics meets their own criteria. It is presently believed that the basic string equations have a vast number of topologically distinct solutions, and that the values of the fundamental constants may have been fixed in an ‘accidental’ way during the early development of the universe. Whether or not this is a true feature of this rapidly changing field, it shows that some physicists are capable of accepting contingency at the core of their own field, while disparaging it in other areas of science.  

If one moves away from fundamental physics, one finds that growing numbers of scientific topics are anti-reductive in the sense that they seek general laws that do not depend upon the details of the underlying physics. The theory of sand-piles (or more generally of critical phenomena) is of interest because of its supposed universality. Individual critical phenomena may be describable in terms of the operation of particular physical laws (often with great effort), but the issue is to explain why similar conclusions apply to systems controlled by different physical laws. Chaotic dynamical systems have applications ranging from weather forecasting to the orbits of astronomical bodies, where the underlying physics is again totally different. Similarly with the theory of complex adaptive systems. 

Laughlin and Pines are among a relatively small number of physicists who have addressed the above issues, and proposed that they should be addressed by using the concept of emergence.​[31]​ The authors describe many phenomena that fit naturally into this framework. The conventional description of phase transitions in bulk matter starting from quantum mechanics requires one not only to take the infinite volume limit subject to constant density and temperature, but also to set the gravitational constant equal to zero in order to prevent the system of particles collapsing into a black hole. In this case, as in many others involving emergence, one has to understand the regime of parameters in which the emergent effects occur before one can start proving that they exist. There is nothing in the quantum mechanical equations themselves that gives any hint that such phenomena are possible.

It is now accepted by physicists that the best description of space and time might not represent it by the simple-minded four real variables of Newton and Einstein. To illustrate this issue, the author has constructed a toy model in which space is discrete and its symmetry group is severely limited.​[32]​ Although quantum mechanics is possible in this context, classical mechanics is not. The usual structure of non-relativistic quantum mechanics emerges in the low energy limit. The model shows that the continuity of space with its very large Euclidean symmetry group may be emergent phenomena, not present in the model itself. 






Those who believe in the existence of a reductionist Theory of Everything universally assume that it is mathematical in form. This puts mathematics at the centre of reality. In other words such people accept a form of mathematical Platonists, whether or not they label themselves that way. Many philosophers also consider that mathematics has a unique status, being the only type of absolutely certain knowledge. If mathematics does not have such a status, then the nature of the reductionist project must need reconsideration.

Plato declared that there existed an ideal realm of mathematical forms, and that philosophers could gain some access to this realm by intense thought, or could remember something about it from the period before they were born. The realm of forms is supposed to be eternal, outside the limits of space and time. Theorems are supposed to be true statements about entities that already exist in the Platonic realm, irrespective of whether anyone ever knows their truth. We call this last belief mathematical Platonism (MP). 

Plato’s idea that knowledge of the ideal world is partly based on memory is rarely mentioned today, although Penrose quotes it favourably.​[33]​ Many mathematicians think about their subject in Platonic terms simply because it is the easiest rationalization of their thought processes. However some actively actively defend Platonism, the most famous being Godel, Penrose and Connes.​[34]​ Most philosophers have been much more cautious about accepting it. One of the main problems, explained at length by Mark Balaguer,​[35]​ is that a being embodied in space and time can have no means of accessing an ideal realm. If the realm did not exist, we could still pursue mathematics in the sense of writing down proofs and examining them for logical errors, so the existence of the realm seems to be unnecessary for the pursuit of mathematics. Some supporters of mathematical Platonism say that their intuitions depend upon direct perception of the ideal realm, but experimental psychology has demonstrated that introspection and intuition are very unreliable guides to understanding the way the mind actually works. 

For Platonists the internal consistency of arithmetic follows directly from the fact that Peano’s axioms are (some of the) properties of an independently existing entity. If one takes arithmetic to be a human social construction then its consistency is not given. One has to hope that if an inconsistency is found it will be possible to make alterations that avoid it while preserving most of the results obtained using our present version of arithmetic. Schwartz has argued that evidence to date by no means compels one to believe that arithmetic is indeed consistent.​[36]​ Paul Cohen, who finally proved the independence of the continuum hypothesis, does not accept Godel’s views about the Platonic existence of set theory. Indeed he has said that there may be no ‘truth of the matter’ about the existence of higher cardinals, and that the wide acceptance of the Axiom of Choice is the result of ‘an impersonal and quite constructive opportunism’.​[37]​ 

It is widely believed that the discovery of an inconsistency in Peano arithmetic would be a disaster for mathematics. While we do not believe that such a discovery is immanent, we are more optimistic about the ingenuity of mathematicians. In the extremely unlikely event of such a discovery, we suspect that once the cause of the problem was understood, it could be fixed by imposing some further rule which would avoid it. If this were not possible mathematicians might be forced to accept that they are studying the local structure of an object (the set of all statements in arithmetic) that was more complex than they had assumed. Statements with proofs (or disproofs) shorter than a million pages (i.e. the local structure) might be written on a strip of paper with the true ones on one side and the false ones on the other, but the strip might turn back on itself in the same manner as a Mobius band in topology. We live happily with the possibility that the local and global structures of manifolds can be quite different, and could learn to do the same with Peano arithmetic if it became necessary. Pursuing the above analogy, Gödel established that the set of all statements provable (or disprovable) within Peano arithmetic is not connected, indeed that it has an infinite number of components. This came as a tremendous shock at the time, but we have eventually learned to live with it.

Platonists would claim that the set of all natural numbers is infinite, and some would conclude that this establishes our ability to perceive the infinite, at least to some extent. An alternative view is that the set of natural numbers and infinity are both human concepts, whose meanings are sanctioned by society. There need be no independent infinite object.  Conventions about the use of both concepts are very tightly drawn, so there can be more or less universal agreement about the validity of results obtained using them. According to this the referent of the term ‘natural number’ is our concept, not some entity that exists outside space, time and human society. 

An argument for the cultural status of arithmetic is the fact that the law of induction was only formulated in the sixteenth century, by Maurolico. It enables one to argue about natural numbers with 10100 digits, even though there is nothing in the physical world corresponding to such numbers, whose status is purely a priori. Indeed there are no physical applications of numbers with 50 digits that relate to counting rather than estimation. The above facts are all consistent with the idea that Peano arithmetic was constructed by generalizing from our experience of counting quite small numbers. The fact that this historically located generalization has been enormously productive does not imply that we were not responsible for it. 

In spite of the comments of Kronecker and Poincaré, the law of induction is not self-evident. Anyone who has taught undergraduates knows that many of them try hard to produce more ‘elementary’ proofs of algebraic identities, and avoid the use of induction until its benefits have been emphasized repeatedly. Its value has to be learned in exactly the same way as other mathematical tools. It may eventually become self-evident, to a tiny proportion of the human race, but that is the result of education, conditioning and a particular aptitude for absorbing abstract rules.

Evidence from experimental psychology does not support the idea that our ability to understand arithmetic is an inevitable consequence of our general reasoning ability. Many animals have a primitive appreciation of number, being able to distinguish between numbers up to about four. Our ability to distinguish between numbers larger than four uses a different mechanism in our brains, and is learned – some ‘primitive’ societies do not acquire it. Moreover there are people of normal intelligence in all other respects who cannot distinguish between numbers from five to ten without enormous effort.​[38]​ This is called dyscalculia and is not the result of inadequate education or ‘psychological blocks’; if one does not have the appropriate, specialized structures in one’s brain, one simply cannot learn what most of us think of as obvious. Even for normal people, the ability to understand complicated procedures in arithmetic does not come effortlessly, as language does; it has to be learned via a protracted educational process. In other words the acquisition of arithmetic involves the interaction of cultural and innate factors, as with so many other skills. 

It has been argued that the status of mathematics as a whole is guaranteed by the fact that our best scientific theories of the world are formulated in mathematical terms. This is called the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical realism, and has received much attention.​[39]​ Unfortunately we have seen that these ‘best’ theories omit so much of what we are interested in that one should not base any general philosophical conclusions on their structure. The effectiveness of mathematics in describing the physical world may seem unreasonable, but so are the success of ordinary language in allowing us to discuss abstract concepts and the power of our intelligence in allowing us to formulate complex plans that may take many years to implement. It is also astonishing good luck that we can explore the world visually down to the molecular scale with the aid of suitable instruments; evolution cannot explain this, and our other four senses are far more limited. In an interesting discussion of the successes and limitations of the mathematical method, Hamming wrote “No one is surprised if after putting on blue tinted glasses the world appears bluish. I propose to show some examples of how much this is true in current science. To do this I am again going to violate a lot of widely, passionately held beliefs.”​[40]​ The disagreements are just as strong now as they were in 1980. 

Another argument supposed to prove that mathematics is essentially involved in the behaviour of the universe is the fact that a few of our best scientific theories have a level of simplicity and accuracy far beyond one should expect on the basis of the data used to obtain them in originally. This is partly the result of selectional bias. It does not apply to most aspects of science, for example geomorphology, genetics or meteorology. Even in the case of Newtonian mechanics, one has to remember it was preceded by Ptolemy’s epicycle theory and Kepler’s laws, neither of which was so impressive. The reason for the accuracy and simplicity of Newton’s theory is surely that fact that our surroundings are extremely flat, or uniform, over a wide range of space and time scales. If our Sun happened to be in a binary system and the other star was a black hole, we would no doubt be less inclined to marvel at the accuracy of Newtonian mechanics. Quantum theory is also extraordinarily accurate, but the mathematics is extremely elaborate, the ontology is incomprehensible and the extremely accurate predictions of QED are not based on a coherent mathematical model.

In the reverse direction one should point out that even in cosmology, most of the major discoveries of the last fifty years have not been predicted from supposedly well-understood physical laws, in spite of the fact that the latter had been in existence for several decades. Historically, the fundamental laws have only been useful for explaining phenomena after they have been observed. In the case of dark energy and dark matter, for example, known physical laws seem only to provide a context within which the observations might be explained, not a basis for explaining the phenomena themselves.

The exact relationship between the mathematical equations that we use to describe physical entities and the entities themselves is unclear: nobody would claim that the planets solve Newton’s equations of motion or Einstein’s equations before deciding how to move. It is usually assumed that the equations control the world somehow, but the author has seen no convincing explanation of how they manage to do this. In quantum mechanics the problem is particularly acute. Many mathematicians and physicists regularly identify wave functions, which are part of the mathematical model, with the systems of particles that they represent. However, atoms and molecules are no more the same as wave functions than planets are the same as points in a classical phase space. It is likely that when a Theory of Everything is eventually found, the mathematical representation of elementary particles will differ radically from the one used in quantum mechanics.

This article takes a position related to that of Kant, who accepts the reality of the external world while identifying our theories about it as constructions heavily conditioned by our mental abilities.​[41]​ The a priori character of mathematics is based upon its dependence on logical argument, as opposed to observation of the world. Its synthetic aspect is our inevitable use of concepts that depend on the way our minds work. Kant identifies space and time, or geometry and arithmetic, as being particularly important. He breaks decisively with Plato in not regarding these as based upon a dim appreciation of some ideal world, placing them firmly in the nature of the human mind. As a result, our appreciation of the external world has to use these concepts, whatever the world in itself might be like. Kant’s classification is supported by current experimental evidence that primitive aspects of geometry and number are hard-wired into the human brain. However, he grossly underestimated the extent to which they have been augmented by social processes and experience. In particular he erroneously identified geometry with Euclidean geometry. Riemann and others later showed that other geometries were possible, and Einstein showed that a non-Euclidean description of our world, in which space and time are combined, provides a better model of the physical world.

Since the time of Hume the fact that the world exhibits regularities has been a mystery. The fact that many of these regularities are expressed in mathematical terms is a lesser one, since regularities, if they exist, must be expressible in some terms. The regularities of nature are also a prerequisite for scientific theories in biology and geomorphology, but these are not fundamentally mathematical in nature, even if (fairly basic) mathematics is used when analyzing the evidence. Among these regularities is the relationship between cause and effect. Hume established that the validity of induction was not deducible by purely logical methods, but he did not resolve the question of its actual status. The Kantian explanation, supported by Popper, invokes our a priori propensity to seek patterns and to interpret the world in such terms.​[42]​ This idea is to some degree supported by taking an evolutionary perspective. One observes that the brains of all higher animals function by seeking patterns in past events and projecting them into the future. If there were little correlation between past and future events, animals with developed brains would not have evolved. Indeed if the laws governing the universe were to change even slightly, bacteria would surely have a much better chance of survival than higher animals do. As humans we can recognize far more complicated patterns than other animals, and this ability is subject to social evolution as well as being genetically inbuilt. If the complex patterns that humans can identify usually failed to correspond to regularities in the world we would not have survived as a species, since this is the key respect in which we differ from other animals. 

Mathematical Platonism presupposes that there is a single thing called mathematics whose fundamental nature does not vary with time. A large number of developments in mathematics since 1920 have made it a lot less clear that this is the case. None of the following points is decisive on its own, but they can be interpreted as changes in the nature of a humanly constructed subject as easily as being considered to be gradually more complete revelations of a Platonic reality. 

1) There are statements that cannot be proved within ZFC (the continuum hypothesis and the consistency of ZFC) without adding extra axioms to ZFC that in effect simply declare them to be true.
2) Some theorems are classically true but incapable of numerical implementation (the existence of a unique dynamics for chaotic systems).
3) Some theorems are classically true but contructively false (The intermediate value theorem). Classical and constructive mathematics study different entities, both are mathematically valuable, although in different contexts, and neither is ‘right’.​[43]​
4) Some combinatorial minimization problems are trivially soluble, but there may be no method of finding the solutions using feasible resources (the travelling salesman problem).
5) Some classification problems are insoluble by any systematic procedure (the isomorphism problem for finitely presented groups).
6) Some theorems have proofs that are far beyond the ability of a single mathematician to understand in their entirety (the classification of finite simple groups).
7) Some theorems have proofs that depend upon the fact that some extremely long computer calculations happen to turn out one way rather than another (the four colour theorem and the Hales-Kepler sphere packing theorem). 

Arguments about the essential unity of mathematics are also undermined by the fact that pure mathematicians and physicists have quite different attitudes towards the subject. Thus physicists can quite happily say that quantum electrodynamics is extremely well understood because they are able to calculate various effects with extraordinary accuracy. From the point of view of rigorous mathematicians the theory is not even well-defined, let alone amenable to computations. The distinction between classical and constructive mathematics, an issue that has generated much heat in mathematical circles, is of no relevance to physics, because both deliver the same tools. Rigorous proof is the central issue for pure mathematics, but finding recipes that give the right answers is the goal of physics.​[44]​  

One result of these developments, wholly unanticipated at the start of the twentieth century, has been to shift the emphasis away from truth as an absolute concept and towards provability, or sometimes implementable provability. In fact proofs are what mathematicians are really interested in, and being finite entities, what they are equipped to assess. Understanding comes from knowing why a statement is true, not that it is true, and in mathematics this comes by thinking about the details of the proof at several levels simultaneously. Assurances about the truth of a theorem are worth nothing without a proof, and could in any case only be provided by God, an oracle or a mathematician claiming mystical powers. In the real world mathematicians produce proofs, always have done, and are judged on the depth and novelty of their proofs. The four colour theorem was famous not because the concepts involved in stating it were deep -- far from it -- but because producing a proof turned out to be so difficult. The formal, computerized proof of correctness of this theorem was an outstanding achievement, but it does not provide us with full understanding, because of its one-dimensional character.​[45]​





Our theory of descriptions is driven by the examples above and many others like them. It owes much to Karl Popper, in the sense that it supposes that the truth of scientific theories is not logically provable. In ‘Conjectures and Refutations’ Popper distinguishes between what he calls essentialism, instrumentalism and his own account of scientific theories. ​[47]​ We agree with his analysis with the following important exceptions.

Our first divergence is that we are willing to accept scientific theories that have specified domains of applicability. His dismissal of the supposedly instrumentalist statement ‘classical mechanics is applicable where its concepts can be applied’, p. 113, would be justified if it bore any relationship with the concept of a domain of applicability, but it does not. The relevant restrictions are often highly specific: they include the statement that Newtonian mechanics is accurate to within 1% for bodies moving at speeds of less than 100km/s, and much more accurate in a quantifiable sense for bodies moving much more slowly. This is not obscurantism as Popper suggests, but highly relevant information about the degree of correspondence between the theory and the external world.

Popper’s second error is his confidence that the instrumentalism of Bohr and Heisenberg would be superseded as quantum theory became more mature, p. 114.  In fact eighty years after its invention no satisfactory physical interpretation of quantum theory exists and almost no physicist expects a successor theory to be more comprehensible. They may be wrong, but it is usually safer to trust scientists than philosophers when they disagree.

A third problem is that Popper’s attitude towards Newtonian mechanics is not consistent. He refers to it as a scientific theory, p. 111, but his own logic seems to suggest that after its refutation its continued use is only justified on instrumentalist grounds, p. 113. Although he tries to save Newtonian mechanics by introducing the concepts of degrees of verisimilitude on p. 235, the distinction between instrumentalism and verisimilitude is metaphysical. He criticizes instrumentalism on the grounds that it leads to complacency, p. 114, but provides no contemporary evidence for this. In fact quantum theory has been tested more vigorously than any other theory, in spite of being the exemplar of instrumentalist theories.

Descriptions are regarded as human creations, whose relationship with the true nature of the world varies from case to case. Two descriptions may overlap, and should ideally agree with each other when they do. Inadequacies of a description are handled by reducing either its domain of applicability or claims about its accuracy. The goal of scientific investigation is not to progress towards a single description of the world, because the world may be too complex for this to be possible. One can however, realistically hope to understand better the domains of applicability of different descriptions, and to find a description appropriate for every type of physical phenomenon.  Mathematically expressed laws of nature are among our most successful types of description, but there are situations, such as those relating to CFCs, in which they are inadequate. Some descriptions are not very accurate and have circumscribed domains of applicability, but are nevertheless retained because of their simplicity. If an event has two descriptions using very different concepts, one is obliged to assess their relative merits and to ask whether there is a way of relating them. There are no detailed rules that tell one how to do this, and there is no guarantee that it will prove possible. A description may be abandoned if it is considered that it is inferior to other descriptions in every respect. This happened with phlogiston and the Ptolemaic system, but it is a relatively rare occurrence.

Descriptions are supposed to provide (partial) understanding of the world, but the nature of understanding is a subject of considerable controversy.​[48]​ The issue in the debate is whether the truth of the matter understood and of the other information is crucial. If so then all understanding must be provisional, just as all knowledge is. We assume that this is the case below. Whether or not understanding is a species of knowledge, one of the preconditions for understanding is that the matter understood should be put in a wider context: the person understanding must relate the matter understood to a body of other information or beliefs. For this reason we do not say that children or computers understand multiplication fully if they know the rules for long multiplication and can implement them perfectly, but do not know why they are as they are. 

The distinction between knowledge and understanding is important even in mathematics. It is a remarkable fact that mathematicians are continually seeking new proofs of important theorems, even though nobody has any doubts about the correctness of the proofs that already exist. They would say that they do this because they feel that they understand the theorems better by constructing proofs that involve other areas of mathematics and increase the interconnectedness of the whole subject. Most mathematicians have little interest in the construction of formal proofs in the sense of the computer scientist, because they do not lead to greater understanding.

Our theory of descriptions is epistemological in nature. The fact that we need a multiplicity of descriptions to make sense of the world carries no implication that the world itself has a plural character. The same applies to the fact that some descriptions involve teleological concepts. The response to a claim that the ‘correct’ ontology of the world is based entirely on efficient causes is to say that even if this is so, we can only understand how we interact with the world in terms of goals, beliefs and understanding. Midgley and others have pointed out that a philosophy based on eliminative materialism is self-defeating, because it claims that philosophical statements are nothing but the consequences of certain brain states. Those who really believe this have no reason to pursue philosophy, or any other cultural activity.​[49]​ 

We do not attempt to delineate the precise domain of applicability of reductionism, but it excludes the concept-driven activity of human beings and explanations involving teleology. Reductionism has been an amazingly successful methodology for organizing research in the physical sciences, and those who make over-enthusiastic claims about its universality must be forgiven. The putative TofE may also be accepted within the descriptions framework, provided it is regarded as the result of unifying mathematically formulated field theories, and divested of the claim that it truly does answer every question about the world that we may legitimately ask.

In a recent article Norton has argued that there is no systematic way of assigning the notions of cause and effect in our best theories of the world.​[50]​ His thesis is supported by the fact that all the basic theories of physics are time reversal invariant. Norton’s examples are interesting, but the fact that they are entirely drawn from physics can be interpreted in two ways. Either physics is the most fundamental account of the natural world, in which cause and effect emerge as useful but secondary concepts in higher level but less fundamental sciences, or the fact that cause and effect do not play a fundamental role in physics is an indication that its domain of applicability is limited, and does not include events associated with human activity. We have argued that the varying level of CFCs in the atmosphere is impossible to explain without taking account a wide range of goal-directed human activity, including politics, and the same type of argument applies to almost everything that we encounter in our everyday lives. If causation is an emergent phenomenon, it is one without which nothing in ecology, evolution or geology can possibly be understood.  

The nervous systems of ants are far simpler than ours, and their social behaviour is best understood in purely reductionist terms.​[51]​ In this context one should only refer to goals as short-hand for longer but more correct scientific language. Scientists need to take great pains to ensure both that those to whom they talk do not take such abbreviations literally. E O Wilson has correctly, but controversially, argued that some human behaviour may be described in the same way.​[52]​ In spite of this, as human beings, we are right to take our thoughts, intentions and goals seriously. Not to do so involves making statements that are considered by the person making them to lack meaning.

Newtonian mechanics (NM) is the exemplar of mathematical descriptions. However, after dominating the physical sciences for two centuries, it proved incapable of explaining certain types of experimental observation, and quantum mechanics was eventually found to give a much better description of the world at the atomic scale. It is also incapable of accounting for a wide variety of astrophysical observations in strong gravitational fields, and for the motion of high energy particles in accelerators, where general or special relativity are much more suitable. In spite of being refuted in Popper’s sense, NM continues to be used as much as it ever was in the nineteenth century. The reason is pragmatic: computations in NM are much simpler than those in its successors, and its basic ontology is much easier to understand. Calculations of the behaviour of machines, the motion of space probes and of the stars in galaxies are all carried out using NM. As it happens the two successor theories have also both been refuted. They are incompatible with each other, and each is only used in the appropriate domain of applicability. It is highly likely that if a TofE is eventually constructed, QM, SR and GR will still be used in almost every situation where they are currently relevant.

As an example of co-existing descriptions we consider the evolution of a collection of quantum particles. Assuming that the configuration is reasonably complicated, the Schrodinger equation must be solved numerically, a procedure that gives little insight into what is ‘really happening’. It is actually wholly infeasible ab initio, and can only be done by means of simplifications (the use of orbitals) that experience tells us are acceptable in many cases. If the parameters of the system are changed slightly one has no option but to repeat the calculation in its entirety. There is an alternative description that combines classically mutually incompatible concepts such as particle-wave duality with tunnelling to give some idea of what is happening. Although much less accurate this may provide better understanding in the sense that one can predict how a range of related systems evolve in time without repeating the calculations. Even Atkins emphasizes that the ‘richness of chemistry stems from the interplay of different explanations that emphasize a particular aspect of the problem in a manner that makes good sense’.​[53]​ Each of the wide variety of models provides insights that are very simple to apply, subject to the need to learn the situations in which the model is appropriate.

I conclude with a short discussion of the religious description of the world. Creationist dogma fails to fit into the scheme described here because it is based on appeals to authority or revealed truth rather than evidence. In our theory descriptions compete with each other and are modified or abandoned depending on their comparative merits, which may vary as time passes. Although more moderate claims that a religious perspective helps one to understand certain aspects of the world better than other modes of description cannot be dismissed so easily, the extent of the disagreements between different religious leaders suggests that it is prudent to restrict our theory of descriptions to testable statements about the natural world at the present time. 
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